# Stable Matching

CS 70 Discussion 1B

Raymond Tsao

2025-01-24

Note: These slides are unofficial course materials. Please use the notes as the only single source of truth.

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	В	A	С
3	A	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

#### Note (Gale Shapely Algorithm):

On each iteration (day)

- Step 1: Each job proposes to its favorite
- Step 2: Each candidate reject all but their favorite offers.
- Step 3: Each rejected job crosses off the candidate who rejected its offer from its list

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	В	A	С
3	A	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С			
A			
В			
С			

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	В	A	С
3	A	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1		
A			
В			
С			

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	В	A	С
3	A	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1		
A			
В			
С			

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	В	A	С
3	A	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1		
A	1,3		
В	2		
С			

Step 1: Job propose

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	В	A	С
3	A	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1		
A	1,🗶		
В	2		
С			

Step 2: Candidate reject

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	В	A	С
3	X	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1		
A	1,🗶		
В	2		
С			

Step 3: Job update preference

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	В	A	С
3	X	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2		
A	1,🗶			
В	2			
С				

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	В	A	С
3	X	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2		
A	1,🗶	1		
В	2	2,3		
С				

Step 1: Job propose

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	В	A	С
3	X	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2		
A	1, <mark>X</mark>	1		
В	2	<b>X</b> , 3		
С				

Step 2: Candidate reject

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	K	A	С
3	X	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2		
A	1,🗶	1		
В	2	<b>X</b> , 3		
С				

Step 3: Job update preference

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	X	A	С
3	×	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	
A	1, <mark>X</mark>	1		
В	2	<b>X</b> , 3		
С				

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	X	A	С
3	X	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	
A	1,🗶	1	1, 2	
В	2	<b>X</b> , 3	3	
С				

Step 1: Job propose

J		С	
1	A	В	С
2	X	A	С
3	X	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	
A	1, <mark>X</mark>	1	<b>¾</b> , 2	
В	2	<b>X</b> , 3	3	
С				

Step 2: Candidate reject

J		С	
1	X	В	С
2	X	A	С
3	X	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	
A	1, <b>X</b>	1	<b>¾</b> , 2	
В	2	<b>X</b> , 3	3	
С				

Step 3: Job update preference

J	С		
1	X	В	С
2	X	A	С
3	X	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	
A	1, <mark>X</mark>	1	<b>¾</b> , 2		
В	2	<b>X</b> , 3	3		
С					

J		С	
1	X	В	С
2	X	A	С
3	X	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	
A	1,🗶	1	<b>¾</b> , 2	2	
В	2	<b>X</b> , 3	3	1,3	
С					

Step 1: Job propose

J		С	
1	X	В	С
2	X	A	С
3	X	В	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	
A	1, <mark>X</mark>	1	<b>¾</b> , 2	2	
В	2	<b>X</b> , 3	3	1 <b>,X</b>	
С					

Step 2: Candidate reject

J		С	
1	X	В	С
2	X	A	С
3	X	K	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	
A	1, <mark>X</mark>	1	<b>¾</b> , 2	2	
В	2	<b>X</b> , 3	3	1 <b>,X</b>	
С					

Step 3: Job update preference

J		С	
1	Ж	В	С
2	X	A	С
3	X	K	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
A	1, <mark>X</mark>	1	<b>¾</b> , 2	2	
В	2	<b>X</b> , 3	3	1, <b>X</b>	
С					

J		С	
1	X	В	С
2	X	A	С
3	×	K	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

С	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
A	1, <mark>X</mark>	1	<b>¾</b> , 2	2	2
В	2	<b>X</b> , 3	3	1 <b>,X</b>	1
С					3

**Obs 1:** After each day we cross out at least one entry

- Guarantee terminates  $\leq n^2$  days
- Tighter bound  $(n-1)^2 + 1$  days

J		С	
1	X	В	С
2	X	A	С
3	×	X	С

С		J	
A	2	1	3
В	1	3	2
С	1	2	3

Obs 2: Candidates always becomes happier


• Candidate takes "max"

Obs 3: Jobs always becomes worse off.

С	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
A	1, <b>X</b>	1	<b>¾,</b> 2	2	2
В	2	<b>X</b> , 3	3	1,🗶	1
С					3

#### Problem 2 Propose-and-Reject Proofs


(a) In any execution of the algorithm, if a candidate receives a proposal on day i, then they receive some proposal on every day thereafter until termination



Candidates always gets better off over time (violates improvement lemma)!

#### Problem 2 Propose-and-Reject Proofs

(b) In any execution of the algorithm, if a candidate receives no proposal on day i, then they receive no proposal on any previous days



Candidates always gets better off over time (violates improvement lemma)!

#### Problem 2 Propose-and-Reject Proofs

(c) In any execution of the algorithm, there is at least one candidate who only receives a single proposal

Suppose the algorithm takes k days.

- $\Longrightarrow$  The algorithm does not terminate on day k-1
- $\implies$  At least one candidate C does not receive an offer on day k-1
- $\implies$  C does not receive any offer prior to day k-1
- $\implies$  C receives its first (and only) proposal on day k

(a) There is a stable matching instance for n jobs and n candidates, such that in a stable matching algorithm with jobs proposing, every job ends up with its least preferred candidate.

J		С	
1	X	×	A
2	X	X	В
3	X	×	С


- ⇒ Each job proposed to every candidate
- ⇒ Each candidate recieves a proposal from every job

But by 2c, there is at least one candidate who recieves a single proposal!



(b) In a stable matching instance, if job J and candidate C each put each other at the top of their respective preference lists, then J must be paired with C in every stable pairing.

What if not?



- J prefers C over C\*
- C prefers J over J\*

#### <u>True</u>

(c) In a stable matching instance with at least two jobs and two candidates, if job J and candidate C each put each other at the bottom of their respective preference lists, then J cannot be paired with C in any stable pairing.

No idea whether to prove or disprove...

Try small cases

J	С		
1	A	В	
2	A	В	


С		J	
A	1	2	
В	1	2	

 $\{(1,A),(2,B)\}$  is a stable pairing!

(d) For every n>1, there is a stable matching instance for n jobs and n candidates which has an unstable pairing where every unmatched job-candidate pair is a rogue couple or pairing.

J		С	
1	A	В	
2	В	A	

С		J	
A	1	2	
В	2	1	



<u>True</u>